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ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
A DUTY TO WARN: ONE AMERICAN VIEW
OF THE EC PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
By ANITA BERNSTEIN
European Community Directive 85/374, titled "On the approximation of the
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States con-
cerning liability for defective products,"1 is known as a strict liability measure,
although the phrase "strict products liability" or "strict liability" does not
appear in it. Instead, "liability without fault on the part of the producer" signals
its message. A detailed Preamble announces goals and explains substantive
choices, later detailed in specific articles. Major provisions include a "de-
velopment risks" defence (the exoneration of manufacturers for damage
caused by defects unknowable to them at the time of production) as well
as definitions of "producer" and "defective product," and a cap on damages.2
The Commission has applied a familiar but ambiguous term, harmonization,
to this effort.
Writers of academic commentary agree that the Directive brings the twelve
sovereigns together in key. An expanding literature 3 describes the major
differences among the existing national laws, explains the need for unification,
and details some of the prior debates over substance. The chords progress.
Voices of experience echo the themes of melody and resolution. 4
The sounds from European Community nations themselves, however, have
been discordant in the years since the Directive was promulgated. Most nations
failed to adopt a conforming statute before the 1988 deadline.5 Other countries
passed statutes that the European Commission decided were nonconforming. 6
As I write, more than two years after the deadline, the Community has won
1. 28 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 210) 29 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Directive].
2. See Directive, supra note 1, art.7(e) (development risks); arts.2, 3, 6 (definitions);
art.16 (1) (cap on damages). Member states are free to accept or reject the damages
cap and the development risks defence.
3. See Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement - Foreign National
Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 342 (1978); Fagnart, La Directive
du 25 Juillet 1985 sur a Responsibiliti du Fail des Produits, Cahiers De Droit Europeen
51 (1987); Shettler, Products Liability: A Comparison of U.S. and EEC Systems, Syr.
J. Int'l L. & Comm. 155 (1986); Ghestin, La Directive Communautaire du 25 Juillet
sur la Responsibiliti du Fait des Produits Defectueux, D.S. Jur. 135 (1986).
4. See Thieffry, Van Doom & Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation,
Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Ins. L.J.
65 (1989) [hereinafter cited as ThiefftyJ; Taschner, Product Liability in Europe, in EEC
Strict Liability in 1992, at 85 (Practising Law Inst. 1989) [hereinafter cited as EEC
Strict Liability]; Bourgoignie Where We Stand on Product Liability, 32 Beuc News
7, 10 (Feb. 1984). The English Law Commission, the Scottish Law Commission, and
the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury have
all endorsed the harmonization goal of the Directive. See Stapleton, Product Liability
Reform - Real or Illusory? 6 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 392 (1986).
5. Member states were ordered to implement the Directive within three years after July
25, 1985. As of August 1. 1988, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France, Germany, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain had not implemented the Directive.
6. See Thieffry, supra note 4, at 77-82.
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a scant majority of compliance - eight of the twelve member nations have
passed a measure implementing the products liability directive7 - only by
relaxing its standards of what will be deemed to comply.8 The last five years
have seen formal proceedings for nonimplementation in the European Court
of Justice,9 attempts to compromise stalled in national governments, 10 a flat
refusal to cooperate with the Directive, 11 and pointed exchanges of cor-
respondence between the Commission and noncomplying states. 12 Even if
all of these differences were resolved, and the Directive implemented by all
European Community nations, the increasing flexibility in different versions
of the Directive that the Commission now condones will assure divergent
national laws in perpetuity.
Whether this result means that the Commission has failed to achieve
harmonization requires a definition of the term. I wish to explore two possible
meanings: first, approximation, or an effort to unify; second, law reform,
or reconciliation of national laws with a Community ideal rather than with
one another.
Part I of this Article explores, and rejects, the approximation possibility.
The Directive does not parallel the various national products liability laws:
it provides for "liability without fault on the part of the producer," although
most of the people of the European Community, and the majority of the twelve
nations, live under legal systems where negligence and warranty govern
products liability law. As an explicitly-stated doctrine, strict liability remains
an American notion, foreign to Europe.
Part II assesses the Directive as law reform. Study of the Directive supports
this meaning; the Directive is linked to a consumer protection reform movement.
Because the Directive is an effort at reform rather than a restatement, my
criticism shifts from the descriptive to the normative: Is the Directive a good
idea?
Under the Treaty of Rome, the Council may promulgate directives aimed
at advancing "economic and social progress" within the membership. 13
Although the Treaty joined two types of progress, the Directive perceives
a zero-sum, bipolar conflict between "economic" and "social" factions. The
last decade, however, has challenged this polarity. Although emendations
went on until 1985, the Directive was formed in 1976.14 Meanwhile products
7. These nations are Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the United Kingdom.
8. Interview with Patrick Thieffry, June 13, 1990.
9. See Claveloux, EC Charges Six Countries Over Directive, BUS. INS., Mar. 26, 1990,
.27.
10. ee, e.g., Thieffry, supra note 4, at 80 (deadlock among affected ministries in France).
11. Id.at 79 (Belgium).
12. See Claveloux, supra note 9.
13. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
II [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], art.100.
14. 1976 was the year that the Commission offered a first draft of the Directive. In the
1970s, liability insurance sold to Americans became dramatically expensive and scarce.
A government task force report explained the problems of insurance, in part, by indicting
strict products liability as a betrayal of the fault principle. See Report of the Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability (1977). The connexion of liability rules to insurance
in this report augured the tort reform movement, a major event in American products
liability law, with implications for European reformers.
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liability was capturing the interest of some of the most talented legal scholars
in America. 15 They quickly created an important body of literature. To
summarize their key insight in terms of polarity, the "economic" camp began
to challenge the claim that strict products liability promoted the interests of
consumers. They claimed that consumers would be better off if their present
opportunities to recover tort judgments were curtailed. Changes in tort law
favored by the business community, they argued, could enhance social
welfare. 16 The "social" camp continues to disagree, but it has abandoned
its enthusiasm for the loss spreading function of strict products liability. The
old dichotomy cherished by the Directive - the economic sector wants fault,
the social sector wants strict liability - is archaic.
A more helpful dichotomy separates American from European strict li-
ability. Although the American kind, justified by a loss spreading rationale,
has failed in the United States, the noninstrumental type favored by some
EC nations makes fine sense. Below I discuss the differences, and offer the
American experience as a warning to the European Community.
I. Harmonization as Approximation
The European Community has suggested that it favors an approximation
definition of the word harmonization. Its title of the Directive, which remained
constant from the first revision in 1976 to the final version in 1985, used
the phrase "on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States." Approximation is a term of some ambiguity.
To this native speaker of English, it implies replication. Like a restatement,
an approximation would contain the terms common to all of the laws of
member states; and where the laws diverged it would find a middle ground.
"Approximation of the laws.. .of the Member States" suggests a search for
a distinctly European synthesis.
A. Strict Products Liability, American Style
According to the Directive, liability "without fault on the part of the
producer is the sole means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to
our age of increasing technology, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent
in modem technical production." 17 With no mention of defect, this statement
approaches what Gary Schwartz has called "genuine strict liability" - a rule
that would make manufacturers liable for all accidents caused or occasioned
by their products. 18 Later the Directive retreats from this pure stance, but
the rationale stated applies even to the compromised, defect-based strict
15. North America would be a more exact phrase, in light of the contributions from Canadian
writers. See infra n. 19 (Weinrib) and n. 56 (Trebilcock).
16. See R. Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law (1980); Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); see also Huber. Who Owns
the Cherry Pit?, 13 Harv. J.1. & Pub. Pol'y 22 (1990).
17. Directive, supra note 1, Preamble. The Preamble to a directive is not merely introductory
material: It is mandated by the Treaty of Rome as a statement of motive. See Treaty
of Rome, supra note 13, art.190.
18 See Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435, 441 (1979).
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liability ultimately adopted. Scholars of American tort law have called this
rationale loss spreading, loss shifting, risk shifting, cost internalization. This
rationale is independent from a shift in the burden of proof, whereby the
existence of a defect in the product may imply manufacturer fault.
The divisibility of the rationale from the question of proof is crucial,
because loss spreading is an idea suited uniquely to the United States. The
belief that a revision of tort law can socialize the costs of injury presupposes
an affluent society, yet one that does not promise to fill the needs of its citizens,
especially the need for medical care. Most nations are too poor, with legal
systems too rudimentary, to spread losses through litigation. Affluent nations,
with one exception, ensure the health and minimum income of their members.
Distinguished by its resistance to social spending and its level of wealth, the
United States is the only country that fits Roger Traynor's rationale for strict
products liability. 19
In addition, the loss spreading rationale means that litigation becomes
desirable. The phrase "products liability," blaming things rather than persons
for injury, indicates a desire to make suing easier for plaintiffs. A plaintiff
brings a claim for entitlement, rather than an accusation. Strict products
liability spares plaintiffs some of the burden of blaming, and thereby en-
courages lawsuits. 20
Loss spreading also makes an explicitly political connexion between profits
derived from the sale of products and the costs of accidents. In calling loss
spreading "the only fair method" of allocating burdens, the Directive isolates
producers as the class that has benefited from traditional rules of law. Thus
even if, as many have said, strict products liability and negligence rules often
lead to the same outcome when cases are decided, the Directive changes
European products liability law. This change clashes with a long tradition
in Europe.
B. Fault, Negligence, and Warranty
As a distinct branch of law, products liability has a history on the Continent.
Long before Cardozo decided to reject contract principles that purported to
limit actions for injury caused by defective products,2 1 French jurists un-
derstood the connexion between fault and the sale of defective goods. French
statutory law provides that a seller warrants a chattel tobe free of latent defects
that make the chattel unfit for its intended use.22 The seller who knows of
a defect is responsible for all damage; the good-faith, ignorant seller is
responsible only for economic loss.23 French courts have long interpreted
19. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 456, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and
Private Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 681, 681-83 (1985).
20. One comment suggests that although the doctrinal change of the Directive will be slight,
implementation will have "psychological consequences," encouraging more litigation.
See Toepke & Hassels-Weiler, 1992 and the Approximation of Product Liability Law,
in European Economic Community: Product Liability Rules and Environmental Policy
137 (Practicing Law Inst. 1990) [hereinafter cited as Euroea Economic Community].
21. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
22. C. Civ., art.1643.
23. Id., art.1645-1646.
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this law to hold even the ignorant seller responsible for all injury.24
The French principle offait de la chose, approved by the Court of Cassation
in 189725 - a time when the citadel of privity stood firm in the f.S. and
Britain - created a presumption of liability for the "act" done by things in
one's charge. French judges derived fait de la chose from ancient rules,
recodified in the Civil Code about responsibility for damage caused by an
animal.26 Like traditional strict liability in Anglo-American law, fait de la
chose linked harm to the lapse of an individual.27
European courts have also revised burdens of proof. Judges in some EC
countries have found liability, while respecting the fault principle, when a
particular harmful occurrence could reasonably have been prevented - by
a safer design, better instructions, or care in manufacture. The courts have
held that the same condition of a product which would give rise to liability
by a seller to a buyer constitutes fault in regard to third persons.2 8 Liability
for fait de la chose, which the Code Napoleon imposes on the keeper of a
thing, seems on its face to attribute responsibility only to an owner. But
substantial authority now distinguishes garde du comportement, the control
exercised by an owner or carrier, and garde de la structure, control of the
internal dynamism, finding the latter control to be a basis of liability. 29
Supported by these two concepts, a French plaintiff today need prove only
a defect causally linked to injury. In virtually all cases this proof constitutes
24. This construction has been traced back to Celsius, who had equated lack of professional
skill and knowledge with fault, and was endorsed by the creators of the Civil Code.
Privity, another key element of civil-law contracts doctrine, was also interpreted
creatively in France to allow lawsuits by a consumer against a manufacturer. See H.
Tebbens, International Product Liability 84-85 (1979), citing J. Donat, The Civil Law
in its Natural Order, I. II. XI.VII. (1737).
25. See Yntema, The Law of Obligations, in Civil Law in the Modem World 68, 69-70
(A. Yiannapoulos ed. 1965), see also V A. Tunc, International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law 28 (1983).
26. See id. at 70. The story of fail de la chose is a neat civil law parallel to Levi's legal
process narrative. See Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 9-27 (1949). It partially
refutes the notion that doctrinal change through reasoning is a phenomenon that
distinguishes the common law.
27. Both traditional and modem strict liability refer to liability for accidental harm based
on the unusual nature of a hazard rather than negligent conduct. See Restatement (2d)
of Torts §519, comment d (1977); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774 (1865), L.R.
1 Exch. 265 (1866), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Under strict liability, an actor who has
created a risk in excess of what her community tolerates is held responsible for resultant
harm. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972)
(paradigm of reciprocal risks). Although strict liability relaxes the fault requirement,
activity by an individual is still the basis of liability. See Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass.
484, 109 N.E. 2d 131 (Mass. 1952) (no strict liability for unforeseeable act of God).
Compare Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1986) (strict liability based on owner's
knowledge of vicious propensity of dog) with Rolen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 240
So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1070) (no strict liability because owner's knowledge of vicious
propensity not shown).
28. See Malinvaud, Responsibiliti du Fabricant, in Gazette Du Palais II, 463 No. 20 (1973).
29. See Goldman, Garde de la Structure et Garde du Comportement, I Melanges Roubier,
51 Tunc. [1957].
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an irrebuttable presumption of fault.30
The rebuttable presumption of negligence, a less extreme movement in
the direction of strict liability, is the law of a plurality of the EC nations
(five) and a majority of the EC population. In Germany and the United
Kingdom a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect; thereafter the
manufacturer must prove that it exercised due care. 31 Ireland, the Netherlands,
and Denmark follow a similar rule.3
2
European law, in sum, has kept constant the theme of individual dereliction
in its laws of obligation, preferring ingenuity like fait de la chose, re-
interpretation of contracts, and new presumptions to the sweeping concession
that marks American-style strict products liability. Favoring the American
approach, the Directive rejects a contrary European tradition in the name of
harmonization.
H. Economic and Social Progress
Art.100 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides for the issuance of directives,
opens a chapter of the Treaty called Approximation of Laws. Literally read,
art. 100 authorizes only minimal encroachment on the laws of member states.
But a literal reading is not foreordained. Partisans who cannot show that their
directive would "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the
common market,"33 the formal criterion of jurisdiction, may contend that
the directive would promote economic and social progress, and thus advance
the broader purpose of the Community.
A. Economic Progress
1. Decisions to Move Goods. According to promoters of the Directive,
differences of products liability law have potential influence on the decision
to market goods. This claim demands the assumption that the Directive will
send a clear signal to consumers, lawyers and judges. Strict products liability,
it is assumed, will have the same meaning in all EC nations. Goods will move
more evenly into each country, as producers stop worrying about divergences
in product liability laws.
This speculation overstates the existing divergences and understates the
level of divergence that would exist under the Directive. A look at the
American federal system is in order, although supporters of the Directive
30. See Whincup, Product Liability Laws in Common Market Countries, 19 Comm. Market
L. Rev. 521, 530-31(1982). A Belgian plaintiff is similarly favored, except that in
contract lawsuits the presumption of fault by the seller or producer is rebuttable, and
the courts uphold some exculpatory agreements and disclaimers of liability. See Orban,
supra note 3, at 350.
31. To this end Germany uses a rebuttable presumption of fault upon the showing of defect.
Judgment of Nov. 26, 1968, Bundesgenchtshof [1969], Neueluristische Wochenschrift
269, 274. Britain reaches a similar result with its common-law reliance on res ipsa
loquitur.
32. See Taschner, supra note 4, at 84. The remaining nations keep a traditional approach
to the burden of proof, requiring plaintiffs to prove a failure to exercise due care, which
failure is not inferred from the presence of a defect.
33. Treaty of Rome, supra note 13, art.100.
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generally disdain this comparison. They see no lesson in the experience of
producers in the U.S, who have never made decisions to ship goods based
on state products liability laws. All American jurisdictions are equally lawless,
goes their response, because juries assess liability and set verdicts. 34 Under
the Directive a judge will dispense strict liability. This judge, however, will
have little relevant expertise. The implemented Directive will remain unstable
at least in the short term, according to its own requirements of perpetual
reevaluation; 35 and even when stability is achieved the Directive will be
flexible. The judge will become in effect a learned juror, able to apply her
own opinion of the facts against a background of law derived secondhand.
Producers would find this system, at least initially, no more predictable than
the American jury trial, unless they can use pre-Directive experience to predict
how each judge will apply the Directive: in such a situation, they are no better
off with the Directive than without it.
2. Predictability. American business leaders have complained that the
worst aspect of U.S. tort law is its uncertainty. High costs can be anticipated,
but unpredictable costs defy planning and burden such decisions as pricing
and risk management.36 Although this complaint has focused on American
vagaries, as a general rule any business will approach a more profitable level
of production when it obtains better information about costs.
The Directive will diminish predictability, however, because its crucial
rules are open-ended. The Directive does give consumers crisp and unequivocal
information about the claims they may bring. An injured European consumer,
even one in privity with a potential defendant, has a tort cause of action in
strict products liability. In addition, the Directive broadens and clarifies the
accepted definition of "producer." 37 For potential defendants, however, almost
any potential source of certainty about liability exposure is kept obscure.38
Whether the Directive mandates defences based on a plaintiff's conduct
is also obscure. One article in the Directive contains a defences clause, but
that clause does not mention contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
or product misuse. The Directive says that recovery "may be reduced or
disallowed" when the injured person is at fault,39 and the Preamble apparently
disapproves of product misuse and contributory negligence,40 but a reader
is hard pressed to determine what this language means. The Directive appears
to endorse, but not require, plaintiff's-conduct defences.
Altogether avoided is the question of liability for patent defects. The
adoption of a consumer expectation test for defect suggests that a producer
might not be liable for injury caused by an obvious hazard: a reasonable
34. See Whincup, supra note 30, at 538.
35. See Directive, supra note 1, art.15(e) (review of development risk defence scheduled
for 1995); art.16 (review of cap on damages); art.21 (review of Directive every five
years by Commission).
36 See McGovern, The Impact of Product Liability, 708 Confemce Board Rep. vii, 1-2
(1988).
37. See Stapleton, supra note 4; Thieffry, supra note 4, at 69.
38. But see Directive, supra note 1, art.l1 (10-year rle of repose).
39. Id.,art.8 (1).
40. See id., Preamble.
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consumer would expect a patent hazard to pose a risk.41 But the consumer
expectation test in America has not been linked reliably to a patent-danger
exculpation. 42 The patent-danger defence, which used to exonerate American
manufacturers before strict products liability took hold, would tend to reduce
the level of litigation. A repudiation of the defence in the Directive would
tend to increase litigation. Ambiguity keeps the issue unpredictable.
The preservation of contractual remedies means that member states may
permit some products liability actions that will not be governed by the
Directive. This preservation would have little effect in the United States,
where strict products liability has superseded implied warranty; but in Europe
contract and tort have coexisted more equally in products liability actions.
The relative strength of contract law means that a producer cannot depend
on the Directive to occupy the field of products liability. 43
The Directive also squanders the benefits of lower insurance premiums
that probably would have resulted if there had been no Directive. The post-
1992 single market is expected to create intense competitive pressure, pushing
down the price of premiums; but the uncertainty of the Directive will exert
a counterpressure. Insurers foresee an increase in the number and size of
products liability claims.44 Although self-serving this forecast is plausible,
and commentators have accepted projections of a 5-20% increase in the cost
of premiums.45
The Directive actually adds uncertainty to aspects of national law that had
been relatively predictable: for example, within the EC debate England is
known to favor a strong development risks defence, 46 but implementation
of the Directive may change this stance.
3. Competitiveness. The relationship of liability rules to competitive strength
in world markets is so tenuous that neither proponents nor critics of the
Directive can resolve the point. But at least one proponent has tried. Thierry
Bourgoignie, a leading defender of the Directive, argues that the change to
strict products liability will not "do damage to the competitivity of European
firms on the international level." In support of this statement, he adds that
"the principle of responsibility with fault is being abandoned by Member
States," and has been rejected by other nations, namely the United States,
41. See Priest, Products Liability and the Accident Rate, in Liability: Perspectives and Policy
184, 210 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988).
42. See Lovell v. Marion Power Shovel Company, Inc., 909 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1990);
Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P. 2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
43. See Report of the legal Affairs Committee, 1978-1979 EUR. PARL. DOC (No. 246)
11, 27 (1978).
44. See Drag, Managing Risk in 1992, Bus. Ins., Oct. 9, 1989, p.4 3 .
45. See id; Whitehead, Product Liability and European Integration, in European Economic
Community: Product Liability Rules and Environmental Policy 83 (Practising Law Inst.
1990). See also Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council Directive
on Products Liability, 20 Int'l L. 1391, 1400 (1986) (predicting price increase for
insurance premiums because Directive "tightens" and expands liability).
46. See 991 House of Commons Debates, Col. 1110 (statement ol Sally Oppenheim, Minister
of Consumer Affairs).
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Japan and New Zealand.47
This assertion is unjustified for it overlooks the existence of trade relations
between EC countries and nations other than the three mentioned. It defies
such rare but significant experiences as the Bhopal case, where the prospect
of a strict products liability forum shaped the litigation and raised its stakes.48
That strict products liability will injure competitiveness as long as other
countries defer more abjectly to business interests is an argument that in the
U.S. has come from explicitly partisan sources. Disinterested writers have
not proved a connexion. 49 All other things being equal, however, European
manufacturers would compete better in world markets under a products
liability law that affirmed the principle of fault-based responsibility. Inasmuch
as strict products liability foments litigation, costs to manufacturers increase.
The U.S. and Japan, important competitor nations, function in domestic
markets with liability rules that are either stable or moving in favor of
defendants. To keep up with whatever advantage this stability offers, Eu-
ropean producers would be better off with no directive.
B. Social Progress
Social progress may justify a directive that would not promote economic
progress. Proponents of strict products liability have relied on this notion.
According to the strict products liability rationale, it is socially optimal to
reduce the rate of accidents and, where accidents cannot be avoided, to impose
a burden of compensation on the manufacturer. The burden of compensation
is an insurance rationale; a safety rationale maintains that charging costs of
injury to a manufacturer will lower the accident rate.
1. The Insurance Rationale. With medical care, income maintenance and
disability protection guaranteed at a high level, a typical user of products
in Europe is ab initio more protected than his American counterpart. All
member states of the EC have state-administered health insurance schemes.50
Observers are often struck by the lack of stigma attached to public social
services in Western Europe; citizens partake of what they need as a right.51
47. Bourgoignie, supra note 4. Japan and New Zealand have actually "abandoned" tort
litigation in favor of a compensation scheme, see Bill of Consumer Product Safety Laws
of 1973 (Japan); Accident Compensation Act of 1972 (New Zealand); and the principle
of responsibility with fault is if anything renascent in the United States. See Henderson
& Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479 (1990).
48. See In Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas PlantDisaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff d in part and rev'd in part, 809 F. 2d.
195 (2d Cir. 1987). Access to a jury, of course, encouraged those plaintiffs and lawyers
who sought to try Union Carbide in the United States. But strict products liability, in
the loose sense of liberal recovery that the Directive endorses, was at least as great
an inducement.
49. See, e.g., P. Reuter, The Economic Consequences of Expanded Corporate Liability:
An Exploratory Study 34-42 (1988) (little evidence of effect on competitiveness).
50. See Report on Social Developments - Year 1986, Addendum to the 2d General Report
on the Activities of the Community at VII-l (1987).
51. See A. Kahn & S. Kamerman, Social Services in International Perspective 316, 331
(1985).
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Despite this protection, the Directive favors litigation as a source of
payment for injury. The Community has slighted its combination of assured
compensation and well-developed principles of liability in favor of an al-
ternative known chronically to fail as a source of compensation, and to waste
money. Why? A ready explanation is that the health systems in Western
Europe face deficits. For several years the national governments have con-
fronted increases in the cost of health care, and discussed ways to reduce
spending. Studies undertaken by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development reveal an array of deficit-reducing measures, designed by
each national government to match its health care scheme.52 A more
conservative political climate, the growth of expensive health-care technology,
and an increase in non-European ethnic populations have combined to create
a sense of finitude. In the spirit of austerity that began in the mid-1980s,
many Europeans regard universal health care as a luxury of potentially infinite
expense.
Strict products liability may have looked attractive to a Commission
preoccupied with health-care deficits. For all its shortcomings, strict products
liability buttresses a welfare system in a country that lacks universal health
coverage. Under American-style liability, private insurers pay much of the
medical costs for which European governments assume responsibility. The
many flaws of American health insurance do not include government deficits,
as the government has not undertaken the obligation of comprehensive
medical care. Beleaguered national governments, and their representatives
in Community institutions, would be tempted by a liability rule that shifts
part of this expense to corporation insurers and shareholders. To proponents
of the Directive, endorsement of loss spreading looked like a chance to save
governments some money.
Unfortunately for the Directive, its gestation coincided with what became
known as the insurance crisis in the United States. The appeal of strict products
liability as reducer of deficits has lessened: defenders of the Directive have
been forced continually to argue that the Directive will not precipitate an
American-style crisis in Europe.53 A change in academic language may have
affected the Directive as well. The "fair apportionment" justification for the
Directive, written in the 1970s, reflects a time when strict products liability
was viewed as a loss-spreading mechanism. In the U.S. today the term loss
52. The three major devices tried in Europe have been the introduction of market competition
forces, the implementation of user payments and the narrowing of health plan coverage.
Britain has tried to create more competition for the National Health Service by allowing
private physicians to perform elective surgery under NHS subcontract, and by adding
incentives to the compensation of NHS physicians. 1988-1989 Survey, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development 79 (1979). France has retreated from
paying for all drugs, and tried to curb the supply of physicians. Id. at 78, 127. In its
scheme of insurance-fund health care, Germany has narrowed the coverage of medical
expenses, refunded a part of contributions to consumers who do not file a claim during
the year, and made other reforms leading to an estimated saving of DM 12.4 billion.
Id. at 95. In the Netherlands, the Dekker Commission recommended several reforms
in a 1988 report, some of which have been implemented. Id. at 46-47.
53. See Thieffry, supra note 4, at 88-90; Stiefel, The Advantages of a 'Civilized' Procedure
in CivilLawProductLiability (notes for speech sentto author, Dec. 14,1989); Bourgoignie,
supra note 2.
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spreading is in disrepute: strict products liability is now said to offer "in-
surance," and those who use this word deem it very poor insurance. The shift
in discourse has changed the progress of the Directive.
In a landmark paper on the insurance crisis.54 George Priest moved the
polarized tort reform debate to a new conjunction. Whereas debaters had
argued in behalf of either plaintiffs or defendants, Priest, long identified with
defendants, argued that expansive liability justified as loss spreading was
bad for all consumers and worse for low-income consumers. This conclusion
came from the insight that liability does not simply shift a cost from point
P to point D but rather creates an insurance apparatus - an apparatus bloated
by transaction costs, administrative waste and the paired ills of adverse
selection and moral hazard. As is well known, the American tort system pays
this insurance money inefficiently: about half the total cost of the system
is retained by claimants, and only half of this sum represents compensation
for economic loss.55
Priest expanded these familiar arguments to claim that the liability system
has had three major retrogressive effects. First, expansive and unpredictable
liability rules discourage insurers from selling liability policies. When insurers
refuse to issue or renew policies, or raise their prices, municipalities and civic
organizations are burdened. Playgrounds, organizations for children and other
sectors of public recreation become casualties to the crisis. Second, hard-
to-insure products are no longer profitable, and consumers suffer a reduced
supply of things they need. Finally, Priest noted that a plaintiff's economic
status, gender, occupation, and race correlate with the measure of her damages
awarded by a jury. All consumers must pay higher prices for their goods
and services as the result of greater liability, but this increase hurts poorer
consumers more. The insurance of civil liability thus charges equal premiums
to all consumers, but pays the highest benefits to white middle-aged affluent
men.
56
A defender of the Directive might reply that little of this criticism applies
to the EC. Civil damages are set by judges, which means that European judges
54. Priest, supra note 16.
55. See Tillinghast, Tort Cost Trends: An International Perspective 15 (1989) [hereinafter
cited as Tillinghast Study]. By contrast, workers' compensation returns 70% of its total
cost to beneficiaries; private health insurance 85%, and public social security 99%.
Id. at 16. Joan Claybrook, a tort reform critic, has called the Tillinghast study "discredited"
for attributing too much cost for the tort system. But the point that compensation schemes
return more money to claimants that the tort system is sound. For a reminder that defence
interests have not always preferred the efficiency of workers' compensation to the
process-heavy tort system, see Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E.
431 (N.Y. 1911).
56. This version of the liability story rests in part on the idea that the insurance industry
has acted in good faith, a premise that Priest does not question. Others have suggested
that the insurance industry might have canceled policies or withheld coverage for
contingencies that were profitable to insure, in a conspiracy to influence legislatures
and public opinion. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic Stablization,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., No. 98 at 13 (1986) (statement of Joan Claybrook); Comment,
Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance and Tort Reform in an Information
Vacuum, 37 Emory L. J. 401,409 (1988); Trebilcock, The Sociallnsurance-Deterrence
Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability
Insurance Crisis, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929, 936 (1987) (conspiracy unlikely).
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would have to be as prejudiced as American jurors to sustain Priest's point
of damages discrepancy. 57 Because damages are so much lower in Europe,
the overall impact of discrepancies is less. The liability systems throughout
Europe run much more cheaply than their American counterpart, undermining
the argument about transaction costs. 58
But this response fails. Priest confined his lament to the United States not
because of conditions unique to the western hemisphere but because the U.S.
is the only country that has accepted the loss-spreading approach to com-
pensation. The criticism will apply to all future takers. Insurance companies,
playgrounds, racism, disregard for women's economic contributions and
moral hazard are not American quirks. They will affect any legal systems
that links strict products liability to compensation. In its Preamble, announcing
the appropriate allocation of technological risks, the Directive forges this link.
The need to separate liability from compensation is familiar in American
writing about torts. Civil liability can never compensate injured persons
adequately, because liability is a function of fault, or responsibility, rather
than need.59 The Directive is correct in saying that fault-based liability is
the wrong way to compensate for injury caused by defective products. It errs
in finding liability without fault an appropriate measure - let alone the "sole
means" - to the end of paying for product injury. Even with "fault" postulated
away, the private-law litigant faces barriers (in the U.S. and more so in Europe)
that keep her out of court, and even unaware of her claim. Some kind of
social welfare system is the only way to express a meaningful commitment
to compensation. Although the Directive does not call for health-care re-
ductions, its timing coincides with these calls. A new reliance on tort liability
for compensation would hurt Europeans.
2. The Safety Rationale. In the years before promulgation of the Directive,
American writers became interested in the question of whether the shift from
negligence to strict liability for product-related injuries had enhanced safety.
A theoretical model of strict products liability won the approval of economic
analysts in the 1970s. They maintained that a strict liability rule was as
amenable as negligence to the task of bringing the accident rate to a efficient
57. To the extent that the American discrepancies can be attributed to factors other than
prejudice by the jury - for example, more zealous advocacy for certain plaintiffs by
their attorneys, or biased supervision by the trial judge - comparisons with Europe
remain valid.
58. The Tillinghast study, using estimates and other private information, has calculated
the cost of the tort system as a.percentage of gross domestic output for several nations.
The U.S. percentage is 2.5. The EC countries studied by Tillinghast - Denmark, Spain,
Italy, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, and France - all spend about 0.5%
of their GDP on their tort system. Tillinghast Study, supra note 55, at 12.
59. See Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 785, 796 (1990). For elaboration on
the poor fit between liability and compensation, see E. Bemzweig, By Accident Not
Design: The Case for Comprehensive Reparations (1980); Sugarman, Serious Tort Law
Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 795 (1987); Franklin, Replacing theNegligence Lottery:
Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rev. 774 (1967).
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level. 60 Some writers, both economists and noneconomists, made normative
arguments for the expansion of a producer's liability.6 1 These arguments
reinforced a view that strict products liability ought to increase safety; when
manufacturers pay for a greater share of the costs of accidents, they will invest
in measures that make products safer.
Whether American strict liability has indeed resulted in safer products and
fewer accidents is a subject of disagreement. An empirical study reports, on
the one hand, several declines: in the accidental death rate, the rate of
accidental deaths at home, and the rate of injuries on the job, all in the last
three decades. 62 On the other hand, a product-by-product breakdown of
workplace injuries shows an increase in the rate of injury caused by particular
products. 63 It is undisputed that liability rules have affected the work of
manufacturers, who devote more time and resources to questions of safety
and liability.64
Thus recent years have brought increased product safety, but only to a
disputed degree, and not across the board. There are several explanations
for the lack of dramatic benefit. The threat of damages encourages producers
to minimize only the amounts they will have to pay, not the total accident
rate. It would be rational for them to make greater investments where the
user is more likely to sue, and more likely to prevail. For the liability-lawsuits-
safety incentive sequence to function victims must sue, and most do not.
65
Strict products liability precludes a defence based on breach of duty but not
on causation, and therefore producers can shift their resources (which are
generally greater than those of a plaintiff) to a causation defence. 66 Or-
ganizational anomalies, employee ignorance and incompetence, small pen-
alties and most of all liability insurance all combine to reduce the respon-
siveness of manufacturers to the effects of expanded liability.67 It has also
60. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis Of Law 342 (1972); ShavelU, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). The theoretical model diverges from strict products
liability as it is applied. Because the model requires an effective defence of contributory
negligence (to impose incentives of care on the consumer) and because strict products
liability developed into a rough equivalent to negligence for many situations, economic
analysts have adjusted their claim that strict products liability is efficient. See R. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 164 (3d ed. 1988); Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic
Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. Legal Stud. 553 (1985).
61. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J.
1055 (1972); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. Rev. 1109 (1974).
62. See Consumer Federation of America, The Benefits of the Modernization of the Tort
Law in the Context of the Social Movement for Improved Safety and Quality in the
National Economy 14-18 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Consumer Federation].
63. See Priest, supra note 41, at 184, 192. Priest also reports an increase in the total number
of product-related injuries requiring hospital treatment, id. at 192, but does not control
for the increase in population and increased distribution of products.
64. See Weber, Product Liability: The Corporate Response, 893 Conference Board Rep.
21(1987). A consumer poll taken in 1987 reports that a majority of Americans think
that product safety and quality have improved in the past ten years. Consumer Federation,
supra note 62, at 10-11.
65. See Abel, supra note 59, at 809-10, 814.
66. See H. P. Glenn, Judicial Authority and the Liability of the Manufacturer, or Jusqu'on
Peut-on Aller Trop Loin?, - AM. J. COMP. L. - (1990) (forthcoming).
67. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L, Rev. 555, 564-73 (1985).
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been suggested that expanded liability makes consumers more careless.
68
The better explanation of why slight improvements in safety have been
made in recent years for increased product safety is the rise of consumerism,
not shifts in doctrine; and consumerism by tradition in Europe has remained
separate from litigation.
Conclusion
A last point remains. In criticizing a European choice, I appear to have
breached the convention of comparative law that calls for deference to the
perspective of the other. Having learned from foreign wisdom, the compara-
tive critic generally takes aim at her own institutions.
As indeed I have tried to do. I wish earnestly that the United States will
follow the leadership set by Western Europe in its care for injured and weak
persons. Tort law offers no succor. The tort system began as pure private
law, permitting actions by individuals for injuries done them by other in-
dividuals. American theorists argued for the manipulation of tort law to
achieve the public goal of socializing the costs of injury. 69 This attempt has
broken down. Tort law, a poor instrument for loss spreading, has retained
its private-law purposes. It did not, and cannot, bring the United States to
the social-welfare level that Western Europe achieved long ago.
The Directive disparages the achievement of Western Europe. Offered as
a palliative for strained welfare programs, it would put national economies
in an even more strained position, at least because of the transactional expenses
of litigation as a loss-spreading device and possibly because of a harmful
effect on producers' decisions to move goods, the predictability of law, and
the competitive position of European industry. The Directive would under-
mine the important cultural norm of favoring consensus over conflict.70 Its
importing of strict products liability evokes abygone day, when Europe looked
to the United States for inspiration on how to build a powerful economy.
But American experience is still of some use. As the Community has done
with the Directive, the United States once undertook a self-conscious and
deliberate experiment in strict products liability. That experiment and its
sequellae are described in a literature. In this paper, I have offered some
insights of that literature to the makers of European policy, with the hope
that you will learn more from us than we have learned from you.
68. See W.K. Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety (1984). But see Latin, Problem-
Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 677 (1985) (disputing
Viscusi argument).
69. See G. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History 146-53 (1980); Green,
Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
70. According to a German historian, "already in the Middle Ages public opinion praised
one principle - which applied to all economic and social measures - that it was better
to prevent than to heal, in other words, that as a matter of principle one should combat
everything that might possibly lead to conflicts." ff. Bechtel, Wirtschaftsund
Sozialgeschicte Deutschlands 91 (1967) (translated by D. Gerber).
